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Market Economies of the Western 
Balkans Compared to the Central and 
Eastern European Model of Capitalism 
Abstract
Using the Central and Eastern European model of capitalism, this paper 
compares the market economies of the Western Balkan countries to the post-
socialist European Union member states. It analyzes the main institutional 
areas of a socio-economic system such as product markets, innovation system, 
financial system, labor market and industrial relations, social protection and the 
educational system. The comparison of institutional systems does not provide 
an unambiguous answer to the question of whether the Western Balkan market 
economies fit into the model. There are many similarities between the institutional 
arrangements of the two regions, and the differences seem to be a consequence 
of delayed reforms rather than of an alternative model. However, the question 
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of whether the current differences will be institutionalized or whether they will 
create a new normality—a new, distinct model of capitalism—remains open.
Keywords: Central and Eastern European model of capitalism, economic 
transformation, Western Balkans, institutional comparison  
JEL classification: P16, P30, P52 
1  Introduction
The communist system collapsed in the Western Balkan (WB) countries at the 
same time as in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. However, 
the conflicts and wars which accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia impeded 
the economic transformation from a socialist self-management system to a 
market economy. The reforms of transition have been achieved over the past 15 
years. In 2015 both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) published comprehensive 
reports on the economic transition and current challenges of the WB countries 
(Murgasova et al., 2015; Gabrisch et al., 2015). The question arises regarding 
the similarities between institutional settings of this region and CEE countries’ 
institutional arrangements. Relying on the results of an empirical investigation, 
I assume in this paper that a distinct model of CEE capitalism can be outlined 
in the European Union. First, I summarize the essential features of this model, 
then I compare the institutional areas of the socio-economic system in the CEE 
model to the institutions of the WB countries. It must be emphasized that it is a 
very preliminary analysis and the aim of this paper is to provide ideas for further 
research rather than to reach final conclusions. 
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2  The Model of Capitalism in Central  
and Eastern Europe
Globalization and the fall of the Soviet Empire have made it timely to question 
whether countries are heading for a single model of capitalism as a result of 
international competition. The most influential line of literature in institutional 
comparison over the last fifteen years was the school of varieties of capitalism 
(VoC). Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (2001) published their volume of 
studies titled Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage. In its introduction, they elaborated a new theoretical framework for 
the survey of developed national economies. They introduced the two ideal types 
of capitalism, the coordinated and liberal market economy through the cases of 
Germany and the U.S. 
Another line of economic literature studies particularly the member states of the 
European Union. In the 1990s, increasing attention was drawn to the national 
differences experienced among EU member states. Here I note three frequently 
quoted works on this topic: Ebbinghaus (1999), Boeri (2002), and Sapir (2006) 
described and verified the Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, Continental and Mediterranean 
models empirically. This approach also ignores the CEE countries.
In the last two decades, several attempts have been made to compare CEE 
countries with the existing models, but these cover only a few countries, or the 
scope of the applied data and viewpoint is not as wide as in the case of the old 
capitalist countries (e.g., Blanke and Hoffmann, 2008; Buchen, 2007; Cernat, 
2006; Csaba, 2009; Feldmann, 2007; Lane, 2007; King, 2007; Knell and 
Srholec, 2007; Mykhnenko, 2007; Schweickert et al., 2013). 
Nölke and Vliegenhart (2009) prepare a thorough inventory of the attempts 
made so far in the framework of VoC to classify the market economies that have 
emerged in the transition countries. They note the discrepancy in these attempts 
because some studies have argued that the CEE countries converge towards the 
liberal model, while others claim that a convergence towards the coordinated 
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market economy occurred. A third group regards these countries as the hybrid 
variation of the two models. Nölke and Vliegenhart (2009) argue that the 
contradictory results can be attributed to the premature, mechanistic application 
of quantitative approaches. In their study, they prove the existence of a new 
capitalism model, which they termed a dependent market economy, but their 
investigation covers Visegrád countries only. The authors derive all features of the 
dependent market economy model from the essential role of foreign capital, which 
has a huge impact on the system of corporate governance, industrial relations, 
education and training, as well as the innovation system. It is without doubt that 
the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) has its special features compared to the 
developed, old-market economies, and it has an explanatory power concerning 
the evolution and operation of the institutional system. However, in their study, 
the authors apply FDI unilaterally as a single universal explanatory factor. In 
comparison with the study and book by Bohle and Greskovits (2007, 2012), it is 
striking how important elements are left out from the attempt to understand the 
institutional systems of the countries concerned.
Bohle and Greskovits (2007, 2012) argue that after the fall of the socialist 
system, three versions of capitalism emerged in Central and Eastern Europe: 
a purely neoliberal type in the Baltic states, an “embedded” neoliberal type in 
the Visegrád countries and a neo-corporatist system in Slovenia. When creating 
these types, the authors address new aspects, not those described so far. In 
addition to the usually examined fields of the welfare state and labor relations, 
industrial structural change, macroeconomic stability and even the dynamism 
of the political systems were subject to scrutiny. When compared to the studies 
above, an additional originality these authors bring to the discussion has to do 
with the fact that they take the specific features of the socialist legacies into 
account and, starting from here, present the evolution of the models from a 
historical perspective. In addition, they integrate the impacts of the EU and the 
transnational companies into their explanation. 
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In this paper, I rely on my empirical investigation which describes a distinct 
model of capitalism of the CEE countries within the EU. Although, as Bohle 
and Greskovits (2012) describe, there are significant differences among the CEE 
countries, there are also commonalities which distinguish them from the other 
types of capitalism in the EU (Farkas, 2011, 2016).1 According to this analysis, 
the characteristic features of the model are the following: modernization is built 
on FDI; the innovation system is weak; the financial system is bank-based; 
sustaining competitiveness is possible only through a liberalized labor market 
and low social expenditures; social partnership is weak; the trade union density is 
low; and employees are vulnerable. The elements of the CEE model can essentially 
be attributed to three factors: a shortage of capital and management skills, a 
weak civil society, and the impacts of the EU and international organizations 
on CEE countries. The shortage of capital and management skills made foreign 
investment a necessity, accompanied by immediate liberalization, without even a 
suggestion of the industrial protection measures customary in emerging countries 
at other times and in other regions. This result came from the economic paradigm 
prevailing in the western countries and the level of integration achieved by the 
old member states (OMS) of the EU. Shortage of capital made it a necessity for 
the financial system to be bank-based because a substantial part of the FDI was 
realized in the financial sector, that is, in banks. The functioning of the labor 
market and labor relations is different from that of the OMS due to the fact that 
civil society, specifically, unionization, is less effectual in CEE countries than 
in the OMS. Without the compulsion of EU legal harmonization, the position 
of employees would presumably be even weaker. A low or relatively high level 
of social protection and the suppression of welfare redistribution correlate well 
among the CEE member states with the relative strength or weakness of civil 
society and the depth of the roots and traditions of the institutions of social 
protection. The system of research, development and innovation (R&D&I) is 
also easy to understand, given the lack of a domestically-based, internationally-
competitive corporate sector, which drives the innovation system in the Nordic, 
1 See detailed arguments on the distinct model in Farkas (2016). 
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north-western countries. Nowhere can state-induced research and development 
(R&D) compensate for this lack. To sum up, the CEE model did not emerge 
arbitrarily but as a response to the starting conditions—it cannot be regarded as 
a transitional state that will automatically progress toward some other European 
model of capitalism, and one could surmise that this institutional arrangement 
might be capable of reproducing itself.
The complementarity between the elements of the institutional arrangement 
described in the foregoing certainly suggests the likelihood of the model’s 
sustainability. The capital flowing into less developed countries seeks out 
relatively cheap but suitably skilled labor and this attraction can be retained with a 
liberalized labor market. The survival of the liberalized labor market is assisted by 
weak unionization, but the former also limits the strengthening of trade unions. 
The lower productivity resulting from the underdeveloped domestic economy 
and the lower added value of the production conducted at foreign corporations 
permit a relatively low level of investment in human capital both in education 
and in the social services. This result, however, not only makes the residual 
welfare state durable but also limits the development of R&D&I systems, which, 
in turn, maintains the asymmetric dependence on the OMS and the highly 
developed countries in general. This type of institutional complementarity can 
be dismantled if the FDI can fulfill the role that economists expected of it at 
the time of change in the political system, in other words, if the spillover effect 
enables the domestic economy to converge with that of the highly developed 
countries in terms of productivity. There are possibilities of upgrading along the 
value chain for both subsidiaries and domestic suppliers, but the outlook on 
upgrading experiences in CEE is very mixed (see, e.g., Éltető, Magasházi and 
Szalavetz, 2015). 
Overall, on the one hand, the development model of the CEE countries 
undoubtedly led to successes. Even in the unfavorable global economic situation, 
the pace of growth is slower, but in this region—unlike in the Mediterranean 
region—convergence continues in the majority of the countries (Table 1). On 
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the other hand, it is clear from the foregoing that the features of the current 
CEE model do not support the prevalent thinking that the new, post-socialist 
member states are on a development path that differs from the OMS only in 
quantitative terms and that convergence is only a matter of time. Table 1 also 
shows that the non-EU member WB countries, which started from a low base 
line at the beginning of the 2000s, have made very little progress in convergence 
toward the EU average GDP level. This begs the question of whether this lag has 
institutional or other reasons. 
Table 1:  Economic Performance of the CEE EU Member States and the WB Countries in GDP 
Per Capita
Real GDP
1989=100
GDP per capita in PPS,  
EU-28=100
Convergence to
EU average in pp
2003* 2004** 2008 2009 2014 2004–2014
EU member states
Estonia 104.9 55 68 62 76 21
Latvia 87.9 47 60 53 64 17
Lithuania 86.7 50 63 56 75 25
Poland 134.5 49 54 59 68 19
Czech Republic 107.4 79 81 83 85 6
Slovakia 114.2 56 72 71 77 21
Hungary 115.3 62 63 64 68 6
Slovenia 119.5 86 89 85 83 -3
Croatia 91.2 57 63 62 59 2
Romania 92.6 34 48 49 55 21
Bulgaria 87.0 35 44 45 47 12
Western Balkan countries
Montenegro 50.1 30 41 40 41 11
FYR Macedonia 81.4 27 33 35 37 10
Albania 123.6 22 26 29 30 8
Serbia 50.1 32 36 36 37 5
Bosnia and Herzegovina : 24 27 28 29 5
Notes: * Due both to the quality of the statistical data from that time and to the quality of the commodities making 
up GDP back then, this comparison is suitable only as a very approximate guide. ** Data are available for Montenegro, 
FYR Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005; data are not available for Kosovo.
Source: Author’s construction based on Eurostat online databases and UNECE (2004: 80).
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In many cases, data on WB countries are missing, which hinders the performance 
of a cluster analysis to compare these countries to the CEE countries. Thus, 
I use descriptive statistics. In the comparison it is reasonable to scrutinize the 
achievement of three subgroups of the CEE model: the Baltic states (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania), the Visegrád countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Hungary), Slovenia (CEE5), and Bulgaria and Romania (SEE2). 
Due to its later EU accession, Croatia is shown separately. Not only do 
institutional analyses support this distinction (e.g., Bohle and Greskovits, 2012), 
but recent research applies CEE5 as a reference group (Gabrisch et al., 2015; 
Murgasova et al., 2015). Despite its special characteristics, Slovenia is closer to 
Visegrád countries than to others. The Baltics consists of small market-sized 
economies, which are comparable to the WB countries in this respect, apart 
from Serbia. The comparison to SEE2 may indicate the impact of the common 
legacy of the Balkan countries. The data of non-EU member WB countries are 
not aggregated because their differences may be interesting. Croatian experts 
emphasize that in spite of seven decades of common history and institutional 
systems, their economies have become different very soon after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia (Bićanić, Deskar-Škrbić and Zrnc, 2016). 
3  Transformation of the Product Markets,  
the Innovation System and the Financial 
System 
It is generally accepted that in the CEE countries, transformation FDI inflows 
accompanying privatization played an outstanding role. These countries have 
benefited from the integration into global supply chains—especially the Visegrád 
countries—and by being part of the German supply chain in machinery and 
transport equipment sectors, they have become export-driven, open economies. 
Estrin and Uvalic (2013) find a different role of FDI in the WB countries. On the 
one hand, due to lower national savings and investment in these countries (and 
SEE2), FDI has a much more significant contribution to the gross fixed capital 
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formation in the Balkans than in the CEE5 and Baltic states. On the other hand, 
even taking into account the greater distance to the major investor countries, the 
WB countries have received less FDI than the EU members, especially the non-
Balkans. Table 2 also shows an ambiguous situation. The average inward FDI 
stock as a percentage of GDP is not lower in the WB countries when compared 
to other country groups of CEE EU members. However, the per capita inward 
FDI stock is much lower and the WB countries remained significantly less open 
economies in terms of exports than the EU members. It suggests that the business 
environment is not able to attract and to absorb more FDI.
Table 2:  Trade Openness and the Inward FDI Stock
Exports of 
goods and 
services, in 
% of GDP
Inward 
FDI stock,
as a % of 
GDP
Inward 
FDI stock
per capita, 
in EUR
Share of 
manufacturing
as a % of 
inward FDI 
stock
High-tech
medium 
high-tech 
export*
2014 2013 2013 2012 2013
Baltic states average 74.8 56.4 7,262 17.7 34.7
CEE5 average 77.8 57.0 7,099 30.1 59
SEE2 average 53.1 69.3 4,168 24.4 38.7
Croatia 46.3 54.3 5,529 26.8 37.6
Albania 28.1 37.6 1,309 25.5 4
Bosnia and Herzegovina n.a. 44.7 1,563 30.6 19
Kosovo 19.6 53.3 1,517 n.a. 7
FYR Macedonia 47.8 52.1 1,929 29.9 27 
Montenegro 40.1 116.9 6,290 n.a. 11
Serbia 43.4 66.3 2,956 n.a. 32 
Note: * The source of the EU members data is the European Commission (2015c), the others’ source is Gabrisch et al. 
(2015). European Commission (2015c) publishes a higher value of high-tech and medium high-tech export for FYR 
Macedonia (45.6 percent) and Serbia (41.1 percent).
Source: Author’s construction based on European Commission (2015c: 82–83), Eurostat online databases, Gabrisch 
et al. (2015: 75), and Hunya (2014: 35, 39, 51–52).
The share of manufacturing in FDI stock is not smaller in the WB countries where 
data are available, than in the EU members (Table 2). However, the composition 
of FDI in manufacturing is less advantageous than in the CEE5 countries. 
Tables 2 and 3 clearly show that FDI has gone to manufacturing sectors of lower 
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value added products, which is reflected in the smaller ratio of high-tech and 
medium high-tech exports. In addition, the capital inflows followed the Baltic 
patterns, and FDI was directed into non-tradable sectors rather than tradable 
sectors (Murgasova et al., 2015: 48). 
Table 3:  Inward FDI Stock by Top 3 Economic Activities, in 2012
Top 3 activities in inward FDI stock Top 3 activities within manufacturing
Croatia
Financial intermediation Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel
Manufacturing Chemicals, chemical products,and man-made fibers
Real estate, renting, and 
business activities Other non-metallic mineral products
Albania
Manufacturing Other, not elsewhere classified 
industries
Mining and quarrying Other non-metallic mineral products
Financial intermediation Food products, beverages, and tobacco
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Manufacturing Coke, refined petroleum products,and nuclear fuel
Financial intermediation Food products, beverages, and tobacco
Real estate, renting, and 
business activities Other non-metallic mineral products
FYR Macedonia
Manufacturing Basic metals, fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
Financial and insurance activities Transport equipment
Wholesale, retail trade, repair of motor 
vehicles etc.
Food products, beverages, and tobacco 
products
Note: Data are not available for Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia.
Source: Author’s construction based on Hunya (2014: 58, 97, 99, 101). 
Services have an approximately 70 percent share in the gross value added in both 
the EU members and the WB countries. Although the export of services—seen 
as a percentage of GDP—is higher in the WB countries when compared to the 
CEE5 countries, and although their trade balance is positive, they cannot offset 
the deficit of trade of goods. The most significant activities of service exports are 
tourism and transport (Gabrisch et al., 2015: 86–93). 
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The difference between the EU members and WB countries is pronounced in 
their economic structures in terms of gross value added by the other two sectors. 
Whereas the share of industry in gross value added is lower in Albania, FYR 
Macedonia, and Montenegro, even in the Baltics, agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries represent a substantially higher share in the WB countries than in the 
EU members (Table 4). 
Table 4:  Gross Value Added by Sector, in %
Agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries Industry
Baltic states average 4.1 21.5
CEE5 average 3.4 27.0
SEE2 average 5.6 29.7
Croatia 4.4 21.0
Albania 22.5 14.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.0 21.6
Kosovo 14.4 20.3
FYR Macedonia 11.0 17.9
Montenegro 9.8 13.8
Serbia 9.4 26.6
Source: Author’s construction based on Eurostat online databases and European Commission (2015a: 77; 2015b: 67; 
2015d: 65; 2015e: 79; 2015f: 76; 2015g: 77).
Considering the economic structure and the composition of FDI, it is not 
surprising that gross domestic expenditures on R&D in the WB are well below 
the level of the Baltic states and CEE5 countries (Table 5). Even these data are 
uncertain in some WB countries and only Serbia and Macedonia are involved 
in the European Innovation Scoreboard analyzing the performance of their 
innovation systems. Serbia belongs to the group of moderate innovators and 
Macedonia to the modest innovators (European Commission, 2015c). However, 
it is more encouraging that 18 percent of firms are engaged in either product 
or/and process innovation, and 29 percent in organizational or/and marketing 
innovation (Sanfey, Milatović and Krešić, 2016: 33).
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Table 5:  Indicators of Business Environment and R&D Expenditure
Doing Business
scores
2016
EBRD Transition 
indicators*
2014
Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D, 
as % of GDP**
2013
Baltic states average 78.99 3.9 1.09
CEE5 average 74.84 3.8 1.52
SEE2 average 73.75 3.7 0.52
Croatia 72.71 3.8 0.81
Albania 60.50 3.5 ≈0.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 63.71 3.1 0.33
Kosovo 66.22 2.9 <0.2
FYR Macedonia 80.18 3.6 0.44
Montenegro 71.85 3.3 0.38
Serbia 68.41 3.2 0.73
Notes: * The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a 
rigid centrally-planned economy, and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. The Czech 
Republic and Estonia are not assessed. ** The source of the data for the EU members, Montenegro, and Serbia is the 
Eurostat database, and European Commission reports for all other countries.
Source: Author’s construction based on EBRD’s online databases, Eurostat online databases, European Commission 
(2015a: 66; 2015b: 70; 2015d: 47; 2015g: 80), and World Bank (2016a: 5).
As we have seen above, the scale of FDI inflows indicates that the business 
environment in the WB countries has not sufficiently developed yet. Their World 
Bank’s Doing Business scores have increased, but they are lower than the EU 
members’ scores, with the exception of FYR Macedonia. These scores measure 
how easy it is to do business, and this ranking does not comply fully with the 
EBRD transition indicators, which measure the progress of privatization and 
liberalization reforms (Table 5). The price and trade liberalization is completed 
in each WB country, but many inefficient state-owned enterprises with weak 
governance remain to be privatized. The indicator of large scale privatization 
is equal or below 3 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia, and the 
indicator of governance and enterprise restructuring is between 2 and 2.7 in 
each country.
Financial sectors underwent significant transformation in the WB countries 
prior to the 2008 global crisis. The new institutional setting is very similar to 
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the CEE financial systems. Financial deepening has been driven by FDI, and 
the banking system has been dominated by foreign owners. Financial systems 
are bank-based, and the role of financial markets in funding is meager (Table 
6). The assets of investment, insurance, and pension funds are less than 20 
percent of the assets of the financial sectors in WB countries (Gabrisch et al., 
2015: 43). In the aftermath of the crisis, the slowdown of economic growth and 
credit demand affected both the banking sector and stock market capitalization. 
The deleveraging process has decreased the banks’ assets, and the rate of stock 
market capitalization has also diminished, but the institutional system remains 
unchanged. The monetary regimes of the Balkan countries are just as different 
as those of the EU members: Montenegro and Kosovo unilaterally adopted the 
euro; Croatia and Serbia introduced a managed float; Macedonia pegs against 
the euro; Bosnia and Herzegovina has a currency board; Albania adopted a 
floating exchange rate (EBRD online databases).
Table 6:  Some Important Indicators of the Financial System 
Deposit 
money banks’ 
assets to 
GDP*, in %
Foreign bank 
assets among 
total bank 
assets**, in %
Bank 
deposits to 
GDP, in%
Private credit by 
deposit money 
banks and 
other financial 
institutions to 
GDP*, in %
Stock market 
capitalization 
to GDP, in %
2013 2013 2013 2013 2012
Baltic states average 75.9 82 42.6 72.2 7.1
CEE5 average 72.0 66 55.6 57.1 16.3
SEE2 average 58.2 71 50.5 52.9 11.9
Croatia 97.5 90 68.7 69.9 37.0
Albania 62.7 81 68.9 37.7 n. a.
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 59.5 86 46.5 51.9 n. a.
Kosovo 32.8 n. a. 37.7 35.1 n. a.
FYR Macedonia 55.5 66 53.3 47.8 5.8
Montenegro 61.4 89 50.1 53.3 85.8
Serbia 60.7 74 42.9 48.2 17.7
Notes: * Data are available for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland from 2008; 
for Croatia from 2012; for Kosovo from 2011. ** Data are available for Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, and Romania 
from 2012.
Source: Author’s construction based on World Bank’s Global Financial Development online database.
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Although before the global crisis the banking systems of the WB countries—
except for Montenegro—relied less on fast-moving wholesale funding than CEE 
EU members, the level of non-performing loans has increased more than in the 
CEE5. The Baltic states, which also reached a very high immediate post-crisis 
peak, were able to reduce the level of non-performing loans very soon due to 
comprehensive reforms. This comparison highlights the fact that in the WB 
countries, financial sectors require further reforms (Table 7). In the areas of 
supervision of financial institutions, crisis resolution, financial safety nets, and 
the introduction of the Basel Framework, WB countries have not kept pace with 
the CEE EU members. Furthermore, the strengthening of enforcement power is 
unavoidable (Murgasova et al., 2015). 
Table 7:  Transition Indicators of the Financial System
Banking
Insurance 
and other 
financial 
services
MSME 
finance
Private 
equity
Capital 
markets
Baltic states average 3.3 3+ 3 2.3 3
CEE5 average 3.5 3+ 3.2 2.7 3.2
SEE2 average 3 3+ 3 3- 3-
Croatia 3+ 3+ 3- 2+ 3+
Albania 3- 2 3- 1 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3- 2+ 2+ 2- 2
Kosovo 2+ 2 3- 1 1
FYR Macedonia 3- 3- 3 1 2-
Montenegro 3- 2+ 3 1 2
Serbia 3- 3 3 2 2
Note: The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid 
centrally-planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. The Czech Republic 
is not assessed. MSME: micro, small, and medium enterprise.
Source: Author’s construction based on EBRD (2015: 91).
The 2011 euro zone crisis and the following risk aversion induced a new wave 
of deleveraging from the region. The Vienna II initiative launched in March 
2012 could have decelerated but not prevented the withdrawal of funds from the 
region. Between 2011 and 2014, the Western Balkans lost around eight percent 
19
Beáta Farkas
Market Economies of the Western Balkans Compared to the Central and Eastern European Model of Capitalism
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 19   :   No. 1   :   June 2017   :   pp. 5-36
of the region’s GDP in external bank funds. This loss was smaller in comparison 
to the eleven CEE EU member states, where it amounted up to 18 percent of 
the region’s GDP. The restructuring continues for several global banking groups 
operating in the region though on a smaller scale than earlier (Sanfey, Milatović 
and Krešić, 2016: 36). 
4  Labor Market Performance, Industrial 
Relations, Social Protection and  
the Education System 
The most critical issue of the WB countries’ transformation is the performance 
of labor markets. Unemployment rates were high even in the boom years of 
the 2000s, and the increase of unemployment exceeded the contraction of 
GDP through the years of global crisis, with the unemployment rates of 2014 
remaining around the level of 2000 (see Table 8 and Gligorov, Ognjenović and 
Vidovic, 2011: 78). The difference in unemployment rates is enormous between 
the WB countries and EU members (with the exception of Croatia), and in youth 
unemployment the difference is dramatic. In such cases a rigid labor regulation 
usually hinders better outcomes. However, in general, the employment protection 
regulation (EPL) composite indicators are not higher in the WB countries than 
in their EU member peers (Table 8). Some sub-indicators in some countries 
are relatively high but these cannot explain the poor labor market performance 
of the WB countries. As anecdotal evidence suggests, it is more likely that 
differences between legislated and actual practices continue to persist (Kovtun 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, during the crisis, most countries resorted to passive 
measures to address rising unemployment or to prevent it. Despite governmental 
efforts, active labor market policy instruments are less used (Alishani, Shabani 
and Gjonbalaj, 2013). 
Wages grew rapidly before the global crisis and productivity gains did not keep 
up with wage increases. Since the onset of the crisis, Albania has experienced 
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a downward wage adjustment similar to the Baltic states. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the unit labor cost has decreased due to productivity growth, and 
Serbia has improved its wage competitiveness through currency depreciation. 
In Montenegro, wages continued to outpace productivity. Similarly, there is no 
general trend in minimum wages and tax wedges. While in some WB countries 
minimum wages are higher when compared with their peer counterparts, in 
some other countries the tax wedges are higher (Kovtun et al., 2014). To sum 
up, labor costs can contribute to poor labor market performance but are not the 
main factors triggering them.
Table 8:  Some Important Labor Market Indicators
Employment 
rate, age 
group 
20–64, in %,
2014
Unemployment 
rate, age group 
15–74, in %,
2014
Youth 
unemployment 
rate, age group 
15–24, in %,
2014
EPL
2007
Personal 
remittances, 
received, in % 
of GDP,
2014
Baltic states average 72.2 9.6 17.9 2.5 4.1 
CEE5 average 68.0 9.1 22.0 2.0  1.9 
SEE2 average 65.4 9.1 23.9 2.4 2.4
Croatia 59.2 17,3 45.5 2.7 3.8
Albania 56.6 17.5 39.0 2.1 8.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina 43.2 27.6 62.7 2.6 11.4
Kosovo 31.3 35.3 61.0 2.5 n. a. 
FYR Macedonia 51.3 28.0 53.1 3.1 3.2
Montenegro 55.6 18.0 35.8 2.2 9.4
Serbia 53.5 18.9 47.1 2.2 8.4
Note: EPL for EU member states and Kosovo is available from the early 2000s.
Sources: Eurostat online databases, European Commission (2015a: 79; 2015b: 69; 2015d: 66; 2015e: 81; 2015f: 78; 
2015g: 79), Gabrisch et al. (2015: 111), Kogan, Gebel and Noelke (2008: 55), and World Bank’s online databases.
It seems to be more important that due to the delayed transition, diversification 
from traditional sectors and private sector job creation is still lagging compared to 
CEE EU members. As a consequence of the weak functioning of formal sectors, 
vast informal sectors have developed. The estimates of informality (and the used 
methodologies) vary. Schneider, in collaboration with A.T. Kearney and Visa 
(2013: 4) suggests that the informal (shadow) economy accounts for 20 percent 
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of GDP in CEE5, 27 percent in the Baltics, and 30 percent in the SEE2. The 
European Commission (2008: 43) and Arandarenko and Bartlett (2012: 122) 
accept that about one third of the GDP is being produced informally in the WB 
countries, and, in some cases, such as in Kosovo, Albania and FYR Macedonia, 
that share is even higher. In terms of employment, the informal sectors’ share 
varies between 30 and 60 percent of total employment. Gabrisch et al. (2015: 
105) refer to the 2012/2013 data, which show an improving trend in Serbia and 
FYR Macedonia with 19.3 and 22.5 percent informal employment, respectively.
The striking difference between the CEE EU members and the WB countries 
is the level of remittance inflows as percentage of GDP (Table 8), which is very 
high in the WB countries despite the decrease during the crisis years (Bartlett 
and Prica, 2012: 15). This difference influences the behavior of employees 
because these transfers can allow job seekers to extend the period of job search 
and increase reservation wages. In addition, large-scale migration is associated 
with the brain drain (Kovtun et al., 2014).
Industrial relations in WB countries resemble those of CEE EU members. 
Although trade union density is higher than in the Baltics and CEE5 (Table 
9), it is due to strong union presence in public sectors. Trade union density is 
low in the private sector, thus the trade unions’ bargaining power has declined. 
The inherited centralized organization systems have become more fragmented. 
Collective bargaining is largely dominated by company agreements. In most 
countries, except in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, a council for tripartite 
consultations exists, but in many cases only on paper (European Commission, 
2008; Kohl, 2010). The self-management system of the former Yugoslavia has 
not been transformed to social partnership in a market economy. According to 
the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), executive opinion surveys reflect low 
levels of cooperation in labor–employer relations, except in Albania and FYR 
Macedonia (Table 9). 
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A comparison of social protection systems is much more difficult to draw than 
that of the above analyzed areas due to an almost complete lack of comparable 
data. As in many CEE countries, in the WB countries Bismarck’s legacy of 
social insurance, which was delivered by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, was incorporated in the welfare system of the 
communist regime. The system covered a range of social risks but in a dual 
structure, only those employed in the socialist industrial sector received work-
based benefits, while others (e.g., small farmers, professionals such as lawyers 
etc.) could access a voluntary insurance scheme. In Albania, the social insurance 
system was established for the first time in 1991. The transformation since the 
1990s has not resulted in a single “Western Balkan way” but in a variety of 
social protection systems (Bartlett, 2012; European Commission, 2009). The 
recession of transformation, wars and conflicts eroded the economic basis of 
social services and transfers. Furthermore, the social consequences of the 2008 
global crisis were especially severe in the region (Bartlett and Uvalic, 2013). It is 
not easy to compare the current level of social inequalities and poverty between 
the CEE EU members and the WB countries. According the GINI index, social 
inequalities are higher than in the CEE5 countries but similar to those of the 
Baltics and SEE2. The share of population which lives below a 5 USD threshold 
(measured at PPP) is very different among the WB countries, and the data—
even if reliable—are collected from various years. The data of Eurostat on the 
share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion are gathered from the same 
year using the same methodology, but Serbia and FYR Macedonia are the only 
non-EU members which have the available data. The latter data suggest that 
the extension of poverty or social exclusion is similar to SEE2 countries but 
substantially higher than in the Baltics and CEE5 countries. The comparison of 
social protection expenditure is also only an estimate. IMF data on the general 
governments’ social benefit expenditures are not available for three WB countries. 
The Eurostat data on social protection expenditures include the activities of both 
the public and private bodies (non-profit institutions serving households), but in 
four WB countries there are only earlier data on public expenditures (Table 9). 
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Table 9:  Some Indicators of Industrial Relations and Social Protection2
Trade 
union 
density, 
in %
Cooperation 
in
labor–
employer
relations, 
GCI score
GINI 
index
Absolute 
poverty 
at 5 USD 
PPP per 
day, % of 
population 
People 
at risk of 
poverty 
or social 
exclusion2, 
in %
Expenditure 
on
social 
protection,
% of GDP
Social 
benefits, 
% of GDP
2008 2015 2014*
Latest data 
before 
2010**
2014 2013*** 2013
Baltic states 
average 12 4.7 35.3 15.0 28.7 14.8 13.9
CEE5 average 21 4.2 26.9 13.5 22.0 20.4 17.6
SEE2 average 27 4.0 35.0 32.5 40.2 16.2 13.2
Croatia 33 3.6 30.2 2.0 29.3 21.7 18.1
Albania 23 5.0 29.0 33.4 n. a. 6.7 9.3
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 30 3.5 36.2 8.0 n. a. 15.1 15.8
Kosovo 20-25 n. a. n. a. 82.0 n. a. 14-17 n. a.
FYR 
Macedonia 30 4.4 35.2 37.0 43.2 n. a. n. a.
Montenegro 35 3.9 26.2 49.2 n. a. 12.7 n. a.
Serbia 33 3.4 38.6 17.1 43.1 23.3 19.5
Notes: * Data are available for Albania from 2012, for Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2007, and for Montenegro from 
2013. ** Data are not available for the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. *** Data are available 
for public expenditures in the case of Albania from 2005, of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2006, of Montenegro 
from 2007, and excluding health expenditures, of Kosovo from 2007. EU definition of social protection encompasses 
interventions from both public and private bodies.
Source: Author’s construction based on European Commission (2009: 44–45; 2015e: 82), Eurostat online databases, 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics online database, Kohl (2010: 6, 11), Schwab and Sala-i-Martin (2015), UNU-
WIDER (2015), and World Bank (2010).
With the exception of Kosovo, which has introduced universal social benefits, 
other WB countries maintain the social insurance schemes accompanied by low-
level social expenditures. This institutional arrangement is also typical in the 
2 This indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived or living 
in households with very low work intensity. Persons are only counted once even if they are present in several 
sub-indicators. At risk of poverty are persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold, which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalized disposable income (after social transfers). 
Material deprivation covers indicators related to economic strain and durables. Severely materially deprived 
persons have living conditions severely constrained by a lack of resources, they experience at least four of the 
following nine deprivation items: cannot afford: (i) to pay rent or utility bills; (ii) keep their home adequately 
warm; (iii) face unexpected expenses; (iv) eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent every second day; (v) a week 
holiday away from home; (vi) a car; (vii) a washing machine; (viii) a color TV; or (ix) a telephone. People living in 
households with very low work intensity are those aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (aged 18-59) 
have worked less than 20 percent of their total work potential during the past year.
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CEE EU members. The social insurance system in Albania is associated with 
residual means-tested social assistance for those not covered by social insurance 
and extremely low expenditures. In the other WB countries, the social assistance 
benefits are targeted at politically influential groups such as the veterans of 1990s 
wars and pensioners, and the systems have become fragmented and discretionary 
with very little impact on poverty. Due to low formal employment, large 
informal economies, emigration, and ageing societies, WB countries are forced 
to reduce public pension spending, which exceeds the level of CEE EU members’ 
average—except in Albania and Kosovo. The introduced pension reforms widely 
varied in their structure and scope (Bartlett, 2012; European Commission, 
2009; Murgasova et al., 2015). Strong status preservation is similar to that of the 
CEE5 systems.
Unlike other institutional areas, the educational system has no elaborated 
models in the literature on institutional comparison of socio-economic 
systems, and there are few obtainable indicators which could support a well 
comparison. Even the data, which reveal some elements of educational systems, 
are incomplete concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, 
and Montenegro. The level of enrolment in primary and secondary education 
was high in the socialist countries in general. Similarly to most post-socialist 
countries, during the transition period, there was little investment in upgrading 
the educational systems. Therefore, in WB countries, the skills of the workforce 
have deteriorated despite the relatively advantageous inheritance from the 
previous system.3 Nowadays, Croatian students’ performance is close to the 
results of the CEE5 countries, the Serbian results are closer to the SEE2 average. 
Both public expenditure and total enrolment in tertiary education are below the 
level of the Baltics and CEE5 (Table 10). 
3 “By 1981, in Yugoslavia, illiteracy rates had fallen to 9.5% of the population, from 25.4% in 1948, albeit with some 
regional differences, ranging from 0 % in Slovenia and 5.6% in Croatia to 14.5% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
17.6% in Kosovo. The proportion attending high schools rose in the same period from 0.6% to 5.6%, with much 
smaller regional variations” (European Commission, 2009: 9).
25
Beáta Farkas
Market Economies of the Western Balkans Compared to the Central and Eastern European Model of Capitalism
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 19   :   No. 1   :   June 2017   :   pp. 5-36
Table 10:  Some Indicators of the Educational System
PISA results 2012 Public 
expenditure 
on education 
as a % of 
GDP*, 2011
Total 
enrolment 
in tertiary 
education, in 
%**, 2013***
Mathematics Reading Science
Baltic states average 497 494 513 5.09 71
CEE5 average 495 488 503 4.78 66
SEE2 average 442 437 443 3.44 59
Croatia 471 485 491 4.21 62
Albania 394 394 397 3.3 59
Bosnia and Herzegovina n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Kosovo n. a. n. a. n. a. 4.4 n. a. 
FYR Macedonia n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 38
Montenegro 410 422 410 n. a. n. a. 
Serbia 449 446 445 4.3 56
Notes: * Data are available for Albania and Kosovo from 2014, and Serbia from 2013. ** Total enrolment in tertiary 
education (ISCED 5 to 8), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group 
following on from secondary school leaving. *** 2013 or the latest available data.
Source: Author’s construction based on European Commission (2015a: 80; 2015d: 67; 2015f: 79), Eurostat online 
databases, OECD (2014), and World Bank’s online databases.
However, the real problems of educational systems are analyzed in county 
reports and in-depth case studies. Higher education reforms are marked by 
privatization, marketization, and introduction of the Bologna system. The 
insufficient capacity and financial resources of state universities have led to a 
boom in establishing private institutions. In 2010–2011, 47 state universities 
and 250 private institutions existed in the WB countries including Croatia. As 
a consequence, the organizations of higher education have become fragmented, 
the average student number in private universities has been around 500, and 
satisfactory quality assurance has not been solved yet. The largest share of 
students attending private universities can be found in Kosovo (37 percent), and 
the smallest in Croatia (6 percent). In addition to high tuition fees at private 
universities, a significant number of self-financing students at state universities 
also entails that education has become less accessible to the lower socio-economic 
classes, and this exacerbates inequality in education (Gabrisch et al., 2015: 112; 
Babović and Vuković, 2015: 22–24).
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Recently, vocational education and training has been given more attention 
all over in Europe in relation to economic competitiveness. Based on country 
case studies, Bartlett et al. (2014) report on different enrolment rates in WB 
countries: while the share of students following vocational programs is very low 
in Albania—Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro have maintained their vocational 
system and have relatively high shares of students enrolled in vocational programs. 
According to this report, critical problems of vocational education are the poor 
teaching quality and the lack of appropriate skills taught in many vocational 
schools in the region.
The problems of both higher and vocational education are reflected in the skill 
mismatch which can be experienced in the labor markets of the WB countries 
(Arandarenko and Bartlett, 2012). This skill mismatch is another important 
factor explaining the persistently high unemployment rates. 
5  The Quality of Governance 
Recent institutional comparisons in the EU and the CEE countries have shown 
that the state plays a fundamental role not only in running social services 
and the educational system, but directly in the performance of the economic 
system. Therefore, the operation method of the state has to be integrated more 
organically into the models because the professionalism of regulation, the level 
of corruption, and other elements of good governance fundamentally affect the 
operation as well as the competitiveness of the institutional system of economy 
(Farkas, 2016; Szanyi, 2013).
The World Bank also has a research dataset—Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI)— focusing on good governance in terms of both efficiency and rule of 
law. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private 
sector firms. Although the composite indicators based on opinion surveys are 
“soft” data, we have no other comparable datasets. The Worldwide Governance 
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Indicators project constructs aggregate indicators of six broad dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/
terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control 
of corruption. The results of surveys are converted into a percentile ranking of 
all countries, in which the northern and north-western EU members are above 
90 percent. The average value of the indicators of six broad dimensions of 
governance is between 70–80 percent in the Baltics and CEE5 countries and 
below 60 percent in the Balkan countries, except in Croatia (Figure 1). This great 
difference suggests that the above outlined unfinished reforms in several areas 
are not only a consequence of delayed transformation but also that of the weaker 
administration capacity of the WB countries. However, the administration 
capacity depends also on transformation. Sanfey, Milatović and Krešić (2016: 
6, 29) display a close correlation between WGI and transition indicators in the 
CEE and WB countries. The latter made substantial progress between 2000 and 
2014.
Figure 1:  Worldwide Governance Indicators Ranking of the CEE EU Members and WB 
Countries in 2014
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The importance of governance is indicated by the fact that the key finding of the 
recent research of the Global Development Network Southeast Europe is “that 
processes of state-building and their failure have been mostly responsible for 
both spurs and failures of industrialization” (wiiw, 2016). 
6  Conclusion
The comparison of institutional systems does not provide an unambiguous 
answer to the question of whether the Western Balkan market economies fit the 
capitalism model of the CEE EU members. FDI inflows have not modernized the 
economies of Western Balkans to the extent seen in the CEE EU members, and 
they have remained less open economies with weaker competition. However, this 
can partly be explained by the delayed and unfinished reforms and the differences 
between the two regions’ product markets, which seem to be structural rather 
than the consequence of an alternative institutional arrangement. The delayed 
and unfinished product market reforms entail the poorer development level of 
innovation systems especially in the smaller WB countries. The financial systems 
in WB countries are strongly bank-based, dominantly foreign-owned, and the 
institutional difference in comparison with CEE EU members is seen in some 
uncompleted regulation reforms.
We can find more pronounced differences in institutional areas related to 
human capital. The extremely low formal employment, the extended informal 
employment, and the large share of remittances in personal incomes highlight 
not only parametric but institutional differences between the CEE EU members 
and the WB countries, which can, in turn, lead to different rules in the actors’ 
behavior on labor markets. In contrast to labor markets, industrial relations follow 
basically similar patterns in the two regions. In the majority of WB countries, 
the basic elements of the social protection system, that is, the social insurance 
scheme with the—in European terms—low level of social expenditures, comply 
with the CEE model, but, as we have seen, there are unique features in the region. 
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The available data does not allow an assessment of whether the differences in 
educational systems between the two regions are quantitative or qualitative, and 
the differences seem to be substantial even among the WB countries. 
Differences in good governance are worrying, especially between the Baltics, 
CEE5 countries and the WB countries, because the achievement of all the above 
mentioned reforms depends on the administration capacities of the states. 
The reform policy agendas in WB countries—partly induced by international 
and EU institutions—set the target for the achievement of further reforms, 
which would result in the CEE model of capitalism. Will such a model be 
realized or will the current differences be institutionalized, creating thereby 
a new normality, a new and a distinct model of capitalism, remains an open 
question. 
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